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amended and is no longer relevant to 
OAL. 
AB 88 (Kelley) would have exempted 
from the APA the WRCB's adoption or 
revision of state policy for water quality 
control and water quality control plans 
and guidelines; the issuance of waste dis-
charge requirements, permits, and 
waivers; and the issuance or waiver of 
water quality certifications (see supra AB 
3359). This bill died in committee. 
■ LITIGATION 
In Engelmann v. State Board of Edu-
cation, 2 Cal. App. 4th 47 (1991) (certified 
for partial publication only), the Third 
District Court of Appeal affirmed the Sac-
ramento County Superior Court's holding 
that the procedures and criteria used by the 
State Board of Education in selecting text-
books for use in public schools must be 
adopted pursuant to the APA. [ 12: 1 CRLR 
29 J On March 19, the California Supreme 
Court denied the Board's petition for 
review, as well as a request for an order 
directing full publication. 
No petition for review has been filed in 
Fair Political Practices Commission v. 
Office of Administrative Law, No. 
C010924 (Apr. 27, 1992), in which the 
Third District Court of Appeal found that 
the FPPC's regulatory actions are subject 
to review under the APA only as it existed 
at the time of the electorate's 1974 ap-
proval of the Political Reform Act, which 
(among other things) created the FPPC. 
[ 11:2 CRLR 44] 
In other litigation, the state Water 
Resources Control Board's appeal of the 
judgment in State Water Resources Con-
trol Board and Regional Quality Control 
Board, San Francisco Region v. Office of 
Administrative Law, No. A054559, is still 
pending in the First District Court of Ap-
peal. In a judgment favorable to OAL, the 
trial court held that the wetland rules at 
issue are regulations within the meaning 
of the APA; the rules are not exempt from 
the APA; and since the rules were not 
adopted pursuant to the APA, they are 
unenforceable. [ 12: 1 CRLR 29 J 
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The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is the nonpartisan auditing and 
investigating arm of the California legis-
lature. OAG is under the direction of the 
Joint Legislative Audit Committee 
(JLAC), which is comprised of fourteen 
members, seven each from the Assembly 
and Senate. JLAC has the authority to 
"determine the policies of the Auditor 
General, ascertain facts, review reports 
and take action thereon ... and make recom-
mendations to the Legislature ... concern-
ing the state audit...revenues and expendi-
tures .... " (Government Code section 
10501.) OAG may "only conduct audits 
and investigations approved by" JLAC. 
Government Code section 10527 
authorizes OAG "to examine any and all 
books, accounts, reports, vouchers, cor-
respondence files, and other records, bank 
accounts, and money or other property of 
any agency of the state ... and any public 
entity, including any city, county, and spe-
cial district which receives state 
funds ... and the records and property of 
any public or private entity or person sub-
ject to review or regulation by the agency 
or public entity being audited or inves-
tigated to the same extent that employees 
of that agency or public entity have ac-
cess." 
OAG has three divisions: the Financial 
Audit Division, which performs the tradi-
tional CPA fiscal audit; the Investigative 
Audit Division, which investigates allega-
tions of fraud, waste and abuse in state 
government received under the Reporting 
of Improper Governmental Activities Act 
(Government Code sections I 0540 et 
seq.); and the Performance Audit 
Division, which reviews programs funded 
by the state to determine if they are effi-
cient and cost effective. 
■ MAJOR PROJECTS 
Californians to Vote on OAG's Fu-
ture. Proposition 159, authored by Senate 
Minority Leader Ken Maddy, qualified for 
the November 3 California ballot. This 
measure would amend the California Con-
stitution to establish OAG with the man-
date to conduct independent, non-par-
tisan, professional audits as required by 
law or requested by the legislature. This 
initiative would also exempt OAG from 
the expenditure limits imposed on the 
legislature by Proposition 140, and re-
quire that not more than 50% · of the Joint 
Legislative Audit Committee be com-
posed of members of the same political 
party. Because OAG is currently folded 
into the legislature's budget, and the legis-
lature must cut its budget by 38% under 
Proposition 140, OAG is subject to the 
threat of funding decreases or entire 
elimination. [ 12: 1 CRLR 3 I} 
Also appearing on the November bal-
lot is Proposition 158, authored by 
Senator Dan Boatwright. This measure 
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would amend the California Constitution 
to create an independent Office of Cali for-
nia Analyst. While this office currently 
exists as the Office of the Legislative 
Analyst, that office is also under the finan-
cial auspices of the legislature and faces 
the same threat of fiscal cutback or 
elimination as does OAG. 
■ RECENT AUDITS 
Report No. P-115 (May 1992) 
analyzes the Department of Corporations' 
(DOC) management of medical surveys 
and consumer complaints in its health care 
service plan division. Pursuant to the 
Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan 
Act of 1975, DOC is responsible for 
regulating and licensing health care ser-
vice plans (HCSPs). Among other things, 
DOC is required to perform various ac-
tivities to ensure that HCSPs provide 
quality medical care; these activities in-
clude onsite medical surveys of every 
licensed health plan within specified 
tirneframes. Additionally, DOC assists 
HCSP members in resolving complaints 
against their health plans. 
As a result of its review, OAG found 
that DOC has not effectively managed its 
onsite medical surveys of HCSPs. Al-
though required by law to conduct a sur-
vey of each HCSP at least once every five 
years, DOC told the legislature in 1986 
that it attempts to conduct such surveys of 
most HCSPs every three years. However, 
OAG found that DOC did not conduct 
medical surveys every three years for 56% 
of the state's HCSPs from fiscal year 
1987-88 through 1990-91. OAG also 
found that DOC did not conduct surveys 
every five years for 10% of the state's 
HCSPs from fiscal year 1986-87 through 
1990-91. As a result, OAG noted that 
DOC may allow some HCSPs to continue 
to operate in a manner inconsistent with 
the law and possibly dangerous to their 
members' health. 
OAG also found that DOC has not 
effectively managed the release of its 
medical survey reports. Specifically, 
OAG found that from fiscal year 1986-87 
through 1990-91, 86% of DOC's con-
fidential reports to HCSPs were not issued 
within the 90-day period established in 
DOC policy; instead, DOC took an 
average of 335 days to issue those con-
fidential reports to the health plans. Also, 
for 78% of the medical surveys for which 
DOC could provide both the HCSPs' 
responses and DOC's public reports, DOC 
did not release the public reports within 45 
days of receipt of the HCSPs' responses, 
as is required by DOC policy; rather, DOC 
took an average of 164 days to issue those 
public reports. 
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In addition, Health and Safety Code 
section 1380(h) requires DOC to make 
public specified deficiencies which are 
not corrected by HCSPs within thirty days 
of notification. However, OAG found that 
in 28% of the corrective action plans 
reviewed, DOC inappropriately deleted 
from the public reports deficiencies that 
the HCSPs had not corrected within that 
30-day period. OAG also noted that DOC 
is required to open for public inspection 
reports of all surveys, deficiencies, and 
correction plans except for those deficien-
cies health plans correct within thirty 
days. However, OAG found that DOC has 
not properly maintained its records of 
medical survey information. For example, 
during OAG's review of medical surveys, 
DOC could not locate 153 of 247 docu-
ments requested by OAG. 
OAG also found that DOC failed to 
clearly state in 25% of the confidential 
survey reports reviewed whether or not 
the HCSPs were complying with health 
care standards. OAG also found that al-
though DOC has the authority to take fol-
low-up and enforcement action, DOC did 
not do so in 62% of the medical surveys 
reviewed to ensure that HCSPs corrected 
cited deficiencies. 
Finally, OAG found that DOC failed to 
meet its goal of processing complaints 
made by members against their health 
plans within 45 days in 52% of the com-
plaints OAG reviewed. OAG also noted 
that as of January 1992, DOC had a back-
log of 599 complaints, some received as 
long ago as fiscal year 1988-89. 
OAG recommended that the DOC 
Commissioner take the following actions: 
-establish management controls to en-
sure that DOC conducts onsite medical 
surveys according to its three-year goal 
and five-year statutory mandate; 
-implement the training plan adopted 
in March 1992 for new analysts and up-
date its procedure manual to ensure that 
analysts are informed of procedures based 
on the Policy Manual implemented in 
March 1992; 
-ensure that analysts have consistent 
supervision and direction in conducting 
medical surveys and issuing medical sur-
vey reports; 
-establish and implement policies and 
guidelines to ensure that analysts write 
medical survey reports clearly and 
uniformly; 
-establish and implement policies 
regarding instances when DOC deems it 
unnecessary to issue medical survey 
reports; 
-formalize DOC's policy to include 
new terminology describing whether 
HCSPs meet health care standards; 
-ensure that consumer services repre-
s en ta ti ves comply with applicable 
timelines for processing complaints estab-
lished in DOC's March 1992 Complaint 
Manual; and 
-ensure that the backlog of pending 
complaints is reduced to a level consistent 
with DOC's goal in processing com-
plaints. 
Report No. 213 (July 1992) is the 
fourth in a series of semiannual reports 
concerning how the Department of Health 
Services (OHS) processes reimbursement 
requests for certain prescribed drugs 
under the Medi-Cal program; these 
reports review OHS' process for counting 
and compiling data on drug treatment 
authorization requests (TARs) received 
and processed from June 1990 through 
May 1992.[12:2&3CRLR44; Jl:4CRLR 
48; 11:2 CRLR45] 
OAG found that OHS received ap-
proximately 91,000 drug TARs during the 
six months from December 1991 through 
May 1992. This represents a 16% increase 
in drug TARs since OAG's first review 
covering June 1990 thmugh November 
1990. According to OAG, the increase 
may be attributable to a 25.6% increase in 
Medi-Cal beneficiaries eligible to obtain 
drugs through the program. 
During the last six months of its 
review, OAG found that DHS' Medi-Cal 
drug units processed approximately 13% 
more drug TARs than they did from June 
1990 through November 1990. At the 
same time, DHS' monthly backlog of drug 
TARs received by mail increased to ap-
proximately 8,900 by the end of May 
1992. Beginning in April 1992, the Stock-
ton drug unit became the unit primarily 
responsible for receiving and processing 
all mail-in drug TARs. The Stockton unit's 
average time for processing mail drug 
TARs exceeded the five-working-day 
limit required by state law; instead, the 
unit is averaging 25 days for processing 
mailed-in drug TARs. This represents an 
increase over the average of fifteen days 
reported in November 1991. However, 
OA G also noted that D HS reported recei v-
ing no complaints about its processing of 
drug TARs from June I 991 through May 
1992. 
OAG also noted that DHS' recent 
closure of its San Francisco drug unit 
reduced the number of personnel available 
to process drug TARs and transferred the 
drug unit's primary responsibilities to the 
two remaining field offices (Stockton and 
Los Angeles). 
Report No. C-126 (August 1992), 
prepared under contract by Rea & Parker, 
Inc., estimates the net fiscal impact upon 
the state and local governments in San 
Diego County of providing public serv-
ices to undocumented immigrants. OAG's 
study defines undocumented immigrants 
as foreign nationals residing in the United 
States without lawful permission, or 
foreign nationals residing in the United 
States who have violated the conditions of 
their initial legal entrant status. The 
benefits analyzed in the study are those 
state and local tax payments derived from 
or attributable to undocumented im-
migrants. OAG analyzed costs in the areas 
of education, public health services, 
criminal justice, and social services 
delivery. 
The study found that of the 200,000 
undocumented immigrants in San Diego 
County, 176,810 are in the work force; 
87,875 of those have taxes withheld from 
their pay. The study estimated that un-
documented immigrants generate over 
$60 million annually in the form of payroll 
taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, gasoline 
taxes, vehicle license and registration 
fees, California Lottery ticket sales, and 
excise taxes. 
The study noted that undocumented 
immigrants generally tend to commit 
crimes in the same proportion as the over-
all population and represent approximate-
ly 12.5% of total felony arrestees in San 
Diego County. Based upon the felony ar-
rest percentage for undocumented im-
migrants, the study found an annual cost 
of over $45 million to San Diego County's 
law enforcement agency resulting from 
undocumented immigrants' illegal ac-
tivity. Additionally, OAG applied unit 
costs for the various judicial stages to the 
predicted felony and misdemeanor cases 
involving undocumented immigrants to 
yield total annual court costs of almost $7 
million. OAG also estimated that costs 
incurred by the San Diego County District 
Attorney and the Public Defender relating 
to undocumented immigrants approach 
$19 million annually; the annual cost to 
the County's Probation Department is $5 
million; total incarceration costs for adults 
are almost $29 million; and the total an-
nual cost of prosecution and detention for 
the juvenile justice system is almost $ 1.5 
million. Cumulatively, the study reported 
a total cost of over $105 million in 
processing undocumented immigrants 
through the criminal justice system. 
In determining the cost of providing 
health services for undocumented im-
migrants, the study addressed those health 
delivery programs which provide sig-
nificant services to the undocumented im-
migrant population, such as emergency 
and pregnancy-related services under the 
Medi-Cal program, emergency transport 
by publicly-funded paramedic services, 
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and various San Diego County Depart-
ment of Health Services programs includ-
ing indigent care at the University of 
California at San Diego (UCSD) Medical 
Center, community clinics throughout the 
County, the treatment of maternal health 
problems, preventive child care, and com-
municable disease treatment at County-
funded public health clinics. Regarding 
Medi-Cal, the study noted that undocu-
mented immigrants are eligible for 
"restricted benefits" for emergency and 
pregnancy-related medical problems, for 
a total annual cost of $30 million, half of 
which is the responsibility of the state of 
California and half of which is provided 
by the federal government. Further in-
digent care provided by UCSD Medical 
Center to undocumented immigrants costs 
San Diego County almost $2 million an-
nually. The study further estimated that 
undocumented immigrants utilize 9.1 % of 
all health services in the County; this over-
all rate consists of undocumented 
immigrants' utilization of 18.3% of public 
health and community clinic services and 
2.4% of private health care services. The 
study estimated that the annual cost of 
public health and community clinic ser-
vices for undocumented immigrants totals 
approximately $8.5 million. The study 
further applied the overall utilization rate 
of9. I% to the County's overall public cost 
of ambulance and paramedic services to 
yield an estimated annual cost of almost 
$ I million attributable to undocumented 
immigrants. The study concluded that the 
total annual state and local public costs of 
health service delivery to undocumented 
immigrants is close to $27 million. 
In terms of the cost of providing public 
education for undocumented immigrants, 
the study noted that an estimated 12,000 
undocumented immigrant children are 
educated in public elementary and secon-
dary schools in San Diego County annual-
ly. Finding that this figure represents ap-
proximately 3% of the total San Diego 
County student population and 19.0% of 
all students categorized as Limited 
English Proficient, OAG estimated that 
the annual cost of providing basic educa-
tion to these undocumented immigrant 
students is almost $50 million. Addition-
ally, an average of $8 million is spent on 
providing General Education Grant 
programs such as special education, gifted 
and talented programs, and drug educa-
tion to undocumented immigrants, and 
$2.8 million is attributable to providing 
undocumented immigrant students ser-
vices provided through Limited English 
Proficiency Grants. In terms of higher 
education, the study noted that in San 
Diego County, costs to the public involve 
only the California State University sys-
tem. The study noted further that with an 
estimated 85 undocumented immigrants 
enrolled at San Diego State University and 
one such student enrolled at California 
State University at San Marcos, the total 
subsidy for these students per year is about 
$635,000. OAG thus concluded that the 
annual state and local cost of providing 
education to undocumented immigrant 
students in San Diego County is ap-
proximately $60 million. 
The study also examined the cost of 
providing social services for undocu-
mented immigrants, noting that undocu-
mented immigrants utilize publicly-
provided social services to a very limited 
extent given that social services have typi-
cally been reserved for legal residents. 
However, the study examined the two 
programs which provide the majority of 
social services to undocumented im-
migrants: Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), offered through the 
state, and the foster care program of the 
San Diego County Children's Services 
Bureau. The study found that the total 
annual state and local amount of AFDC 
benefits directed to undocumented im-
migrants is almost $12 million; the es-
timated annual County and state cost of 
providing in-home social services and 
out-of-home placement for undocu-
mented immigrant children is about $1.7 
million. The study concluded that the total 
annual state and local cost associated with 
the provision of social services to undocu-
mented immigrants is $13 million. 
As a result, the study concluded that 
the cost to state and local governments 
associated with processing San Diego 
County's undocumented immigrants 
through the criminal justice system and 
with providing health services, education, 
and social services for this population is 
$206 million. Because the state and local 
governments receive over $60 million in 
revenues associated with the employment 
and consumer spending of undocumented 
immigrants, the net state and local cost of 
providing public services to undocu-
mented immigrants in San Diego County 
is approximately $146 million. 
Report F-105 (June 1992). As part of 
its examination of the state's general pur-
pose financial statements for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, I 99 I, OAG 
evaluated the state's internal financial 
control structure. This study of the control 
structure was undertaken to allow OAG to 
express an opinion on the adequacy of the 
state's general purpose financial state-
ments; determine the extent of compliance 
with federal grant requirements, laws, and 
regulations; and determine compliance 
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with state laws and regulations that could 
materially affect the general purpose 
financial statements. The twenty agencies 
audited represented approximately 61 % 
of the state's revenues and approximately 
60% of the state's spending during the 
fiscal year. 
According to OAG, the state loses mil-
lions of dollars each year because of in-
adequate financial control procedures. 
Additionally, poor accounting practices 
have caused confusion about the state's 
financial condition among the state's own 
financial decisionmakers, the outside in-
vestment community, and the federal 
government. In its review of financial 
operations of statewide concern, OAG 
discovered several major shortcomings in 
the state's internal controls and financial 
reporting systems. For example, because 
of the state's failure to use generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) in 
its reporting of the execution of its budget, 
Califorma inconsistently reports its finan-
cial condition. The state's true financial 
condition is also obscured by the use of 
different accounting principles in the 
preparation of financial reports by the 
state Controller's Office and the Depart-
ment of Finance. In addition, OAG found 
that the state must make numerous adjust-
ments to its financial statements to prepare 
them in accordance with nationally recog-
nized GAAP so that they are comparable 
to the financial statements of other states 
and acceptable to the investment com-
munity and the federal government. 
OAG also reported on numerous other 
problems of statewide concern, including 
the following: 
-California faces a possible liability to 
the federal government of as much as $24 
million for profits it has accumulated in 
the state's internal service funds between 
July 1, 1984, and June 30, I 991. 
-For the last six years, the state has 
been unable to produce financial reports 
and audited financial statements within 
six months of the end of the fiscal year, as 
is required by the Government Finance 
Officers Association. 
-For the past two years, the state has 
not included combining statements by 
fund type in its audited financial state-
ments, as is required by the Governmental 
Accounting and Financial Reporting 
Standards issued by the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board. 
-The lack of a central record of infor-
mation regarding the state's leases re-
quires the state to spend unnecessary ad-
ditional time to prepare its financial state-
ment disclosures required by GAAP for 
those lease commitments. 
-The state's grants, certain contracts, 
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and interagency agreements are not routed 
through the Department of General Ser-
vices to assure their validity. 
-The state's method of accounting for 
federal assistance does not provide suffi-
cient information on expenditures of 
federal funds because it does not record its 
expenditures by federal program. As a 
result, the state is unable to present a 
schedule of federal assistance that shows 
total expenditures for each federal assis-
tance program, as is required by the feder-
al Office of Management and Budget. 
-District Agricultural Associations, 
which are organized to hold fairs and ex-
positions, are not treated as part of the 
state reporting entity, despite the Legisla-
tive Counsel's opinion that such Associa-
tions are state agencies and that money 
they spend is state money. 
-The State Administrative Manual 
fails to require numerous agencies to sub-
mit reconciliations and reports of accruals. 
The OAG report also provides detailed 
information on specific weaknesses in 
control over financial activities and 
problems in compliance with state and 
federal regulations in a number of state 
agencies. For example, in the Business, 
Transportation and Housing Agency, the 
Department of Motor Vehicles does not 
have sufficient control over the collection 
of dishonored checks, which totalled ap-
proximately $13.4 million as of June 30, 
1991, and the Stephen P. Teale Data Cen-
ter continues to have inadequate methods 
for inventory and accounting for equip-
ment and intangible assets. In the area of 
educational programs, OAG notes that the 
California Student Aid Commission does 
not ensure the adequacy of efforts to col-
lect on defaulted student loans that the 
Commission has purchased. As to general 
government agencies, the Department of 
Personnel Administration is unable to en-
sure that it properly accounts for the 
deferred compensation program. As of 
March 1992, 21 months after it contracted 
with a firm to provide recordkeeping ser-
vices, the Department was not yet able to 
adequately monitor the program. In the 
Health and Welfare Agency, the efforts of 
the Department of Health Services to col-
lect the costs it has incurred in the 
monitoring and remediation of hazardous 
waste sites are inadequate. Within the 
legislative,judicial, and executive areas of 
state government, OAG noted that the 
Board of Equalization is unable to ensure 
that unapplied credit balances are 
processed in compliance with state law. 
OAG also identified tax refund problems 
in the bank and corporate tax system of the 
Franchise Tax Board in the State and Con-
sumer Services Agency. 
Report No. P-029 (June 1992) was 
prepared by OAG to evaluate the Depart-
ment of Insurance's (DOI) regulatory 
practices aimed at early detection of 
problems that can lead to an insurer's in-
solvency. OAG reviewed the pertinent 
laws, regulations, and policies relating to 
DO I's regulatory system; information was 
gathered by interviewing personnel of 
DO I's financial analysis division, field ex-
amination division, claims services 
bureau, and conservation and liquidation 
division. The audit also included an 
evaluation of the Department's regulatory 
system through a review of fourteen insol-
vent insurers, of which nine were incor-
porated in California. 
As part of its duties, DOI is responsible 
for the protection of policyholders, 
beneficiaries, and other members of the 
public from losses arising from insurance 
company insolvencies. DOI attempts to 
provide this protection by screening 
would-be entrants into the field of in-
surance, analyzing insurers' financial 
statements, conducting field examina-
tions, regulating insurance rates, inves-
tigating consumer complaints, and enforc-
ing compliance with the California In-
surance Code. To protect California con-
sumers from losses resulting from the in-
solvency of insurance companies, DOI 
regulates nearly 1,900 insurers and ap-
proximately 300,000 individuals licensed 
to conduct insurance business in this state. 
A.M. Best, an organization that 
provides ratings and financial information 
on the insurance industry, defines an insol-
vent insurance company as any insurer 
domiciled in the United States against 
which the insurance department of its state 
of domicile has taken action for reasons of 
financial impairment; such state actions 
include administrative orders, super-
vision, suspension, receivership, conser-
vatorship, liquidation, or other actions that 
restrict the insurer's freedom to conduct 
business. According to an A.M. Best study 
cited by OAG, 372 property and casualty 
insolvencies occurred nationwide from 
1969 through 1990; California ranked 
second among the states with 35 insolven-
cies during that period. Examples of 
recent California seizures include Great 
Republic Insurance Company [/1:4 
CRLR 133 ], Executive Life Insurance 
Company, and First Capital Life Insurance 
Company of San Diego [ /1:3 CRLR 128]. 
To combat the problem of insolvent in-
surers in California, the state established 
the California Insurance Guarantee As-
sociation (CIGA) in 1969 and the Califor-
nia Life Insurance Guarantee Association 
(CLIGA) in 1991. These two associations 
exist to pay for covered claims of member 
property and casualty and life insurers 
who become insolvent. All property and 
casualty insurers transacting business in 
California must belong to CIGA, and all 
life insurers doing business in the state 
must be members of CLIGA. According 
to OAG, CIGA estimates that, as of June 
1990, the projected costs for all property 
and casualty insolvencies in California 
since 1985 will total approximately $ I.I 
billion. Cost data for the insolvencies of 
life insurers could not be estimated due to 
a lack of data available in the short period 
since the formation of CLIGA. 
OAG's audit revealed several prob-
lems in DO I's past regulation of potential-
ly insolvent insurers. According to OAG, 
during 1974-91, DOI did not always take 
prompt and decisive action when it 
detected conditions detrimental to an 
insurer's solvency. These conditions in-
clude an insurer's questionable invest-
ments, improper reinsurance arrange-
ments, improper affiliate transactions, 
loss reserve deficiencies, poor underwrit-
ing, poor use of managing general agents, 
and agents' high balances. OAG empha-
sized that delays in prompt and effective 
regulatory action can increase the costs of 
an insurer's insolvencies by allowing the 
insurer to continue writing new business 
while no or informal corrective action is 
pursued; such increased costs are passed 
on to the policyholders of healthy com-
panies in the form of higher insurance 
rates. 
According to OAG, DOI has consis-
tently failed to take advantage of informa-
tion available through national agencies 
and the insurance regulators of other 
states. Although many state regulators are 
reluctant to share information on finan-
cially troubled insurers, California did not 
make an adequate effort to gather the in-
formation that was available on some 
troubled insurers, and often waited for the 
domiciliary state to take action. In some 
cases, efforts by DOI to screen insurers 
applying to transact business in California 
were hampered by flaws in the informa-
tion gathering system. OAG found that 
coordination of efforts with agencies such 
as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners were often 
ineffective because of DOI's failure to 
contact these agencies and/or to adequate-
ly document the information received. 
OAG made a number of recommenda-
tions for the improvement of DO I's work 
related to insolvent insurance companies, 
including the following: 
-DOI should develop guidelines for 
corrective action plans to address the 
problems of insurers in danger of insol-
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vency. These plans should specify a time-
frame for the insurer to correct identified 
problems and provide an outline of actions 
DOI will take if the insurer does not com-
ply with the corrective action plan. 
-The method of investigation of of-
ficers, directors, and major stockholders 
of insurers applying for new and amended 
certificates should be revised to include 
periodic requests for information from 
other agencies, the development of an 
identification system for obtaining infor-
mation from the SEC about specific in-
di victuals, and better documentation of the 
information obtained. 
-DOI should establish a more effective 
and assertive communication system with 
other state regulators. 
-DOI should strengthen its regulatory 
practices aimed at questionable invest-
ments, improper affiliate transactions, 
loss reserve deficiencies, improper rein-
surance, poor use of managing general 
agents, poor underwriting, and excessive 
agents' balances. 
According to OAG, DOI has already 
made a number of changes aimed at im-
proving its surveillance and regulation of 
insurers, including the reorganization of 
portions of DOI regulatory staff and the 
drafting of a variety of bills designed to 
improve regulatory authority over entities 
and activities identified as factors in past 
insolvencies. (See infra agency report on 
DOI for related discussion.) 
Report No. P-215 (August 1992) 
reviews the University of California's 
(UC) executive compensation, benefits, 
and offices. OAG's review of the UC en-
compassed an evaluation of UC programs 
that provide compensation and benefits to 
UC executives; a review of the relocation 
of the UC's administrative offices from 
Berkeley to Oakland; and a review of the 
costs associated with the UC's Office of 
the President (Office) located in Irvine. 
The UC is a public, state-supported 
institution administered under the author-
ity of the 26-member Board of Regents 
(Regents). Pursuant to the California Con-
stitution, the Regents have full powers of 
organization and government of the UC, 
subject only to the legislative control 
necessary to ensure the security of the 
UC's funds and the compliance with en-
dowment terms and certain competitive 
bidding procedures. The state's general 
fund is the principal funding source forthe 
UC's instructional programs. Other fund-
ing sources include the federal govern-
ment, which provides funds for research 
and three U.S. Department of Energy 
laboratories, private gifts, and investment 
income. Total UC revenues for fiscal year 
I 990-91 were approximately $ I 0.2 bi!-
lion, of which approximately $2.4 billion, 
or 23.5%, was supplied by the state. 
In its study, OAG reviewed the salaries 
and benefits paid by the UC to a sample of 
22 top executives. OAG noted that, in an 
attempt to improve the competitiveness of 
UC's executive compensation, the 
Regents have approved a number of salary 
increases since 1983; for example, of the 
ten executives who had been in their posi-
tions since 1983, nine enjoyed salary in-
creases ranging from 21-40% between 
July I 983 and July 1984. OAG also found 
that some approved salary increases for 
fiscal year 1984-85 may have been 
greater than UC Regents believed due to 
a lack of sufficient detail in the document 
used to propose the increases; the actual 
average percentage increase in actual 
salaries paid for seven executives that year 
was 17.1 %, rather than the 10.8% increase 
UC President David Gardner claimed the 
executives were receiving. OAG addition-
ally noted that-at the time of its audit-
Gardner's total annual compensation, in-
cluding base salary and various special 
allowances and supplements, exceeded 
$452,000. The annual compensation of 
the remaining 21 executives in OAG's 
sample ranged from $131,293 to 
$316,551. 
With regard to leaves of absence, OAG 
found that all six of the executives 
reviewed failed to report absences related 
to illness or medical appointments; five of 
the six failed to report vacation leave 
taken. In response to OAG's findings, As-
sociate Vice President Richard West stated 
that, under UC's current legal interpreta-
tion of wage and hour law, executives 
should not be docked for absences of less 
than one day. However, OAG noted that 
UC policy does not state that executives 
may waive the recording of leave time 
taken in less than one-day increments. 
OAG also reviewed President 
Gardner's housing-related assistance and 
compensation, noting that when Gardner 
became UC President in 1983, he was 
granted an exception from occupying 
University housing and was provided with 
a housing allowance to assist him in 
paying the costs of owning his home. As 
part of the original housing benefits pack-
age Gardner received, the UC agreed to 
buy his previous home in Utah, provide 
him with a mortgage loan for his new 
California home, and pay a cash stipend to 
cover his house operation costs. OAG 
notes that subsequent changes to the hous-
ing package often resulted in additional 
benefits to Gardner. OAG discovered that 
the UC may have paid Gardner more for 
the Utah home than the value of his equity 
in it, as Gardner's equity was $15,000 less 
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than the UC paid him. OAG also noted 
that the UC paid Gardner an average of 
$25,020 per year as his housing allow-
ance; a separate compensation for house 
operating expenses given to Gardner 
during his tenure averaged $39,600 per 
year. OAG also found that four other UC 
executives each receive a housing allow-
ance of approximately $3,476 per month, 
or $41,710 per year. 
In terms of moving expenses, OAG 
found that the UC paid moving expenses 
for Gardner and four of the eight execu-
tives reviewed who were appointed during 
Gardner's tenure, averaging approximate-
ly $14,800 each. In these five cases, an 
average of 50.2% of the expenditures was 
for items not reimbursable under the UC 
policy in effect at the time; OAG notes that 
exceptions were granted for these execu-
tives. OAG also found that the UC incon-
sistently reported moving expense pay-
ments or reimbursements as taxable gross 
income to the executives and taxation 
authorities. For example, in one instance 
the UC failed to include almost $6,000 of 
moving expense payments or reimburse-
ments in one executive's gross income. 
In reviewing relocation incentives, 
OAG determined that two of the 22 execu-
tives reviewed were paid relocation incen-
tives in the form of temporary salary sup-
plements during Gardner's tenure. OAG 
also found that-in violation of UC 
policy-Gardner and Senior Vice Presi-
dent William Brady approved payment of 
one such $30,000 incentive in the absence 
of Regent approval. 
In reviewing special retirement 
programs, OAG found that in addition to 
regular contributions to the UC retirement 
plan, the UC has provided a number of 
special retirement programs to the execu-
tives in OAG's sample. For example, for 
the Regents' Special Retirement Con-
tribution Program, which is no longer ac-
tive, the UC changed the contribution rate 
from 3% of certain executives' salaries to 
3% of their salaries plus housing value. 
OAG further noted that as a result of a 
change of vesting dates on five non-
qualified deferred income plans the UC 
entered into with Gardner, the UC will pay 
Gardner an estimated $492,607 upon his 
retirement instead of the $60,850 it would 
have otherwise been obligated to pay. 
OAG also discovered that in approving 
changes in vesting dates on two other 
retirement program agreements, the UC 
may be obligated to pay Gardner an addi-
tional $327,478. According to OAG, had 
the Regents not opted to change the dates 
on these agreements the UC would not be 
obligated to provide benefits totaling over 
$759,000. 
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OAG also noted that the UC provides 
certain executives with automobile com-
pensation for business purposes. OAG 
found that as of April 30, eight of the 
executives reviewed had UC-leased 
automobiles; seven other executives and 
one spouse, who is an approved associate 
of the UC, received automobile allowan-
ces. According to OAG, in fiscal year 
1990-91, the annual cost of lease pay-
ments for automobiles ranged from about 
$4,500 to $8,500. 
In auditing entertainment expenditures 
from July 1990 through April 1992, OAG 
found that from July 1, 1991 through April 
30, 1992, the UC paid $116,039 from its 
Administrative Fund for entertainment 
hosted by twelve of the 22 executives 
reviewed. OAG noted that entertainment 
expenditures covered a variety of events, 
including a party celebrating the wedding 
of a President's Office employee. 
OAG noted that several of the execu-
tives in OAG's sample frequently enter-
tained other employees and representa-
tives of the Office of the President ex-
clusively. OAG also found that when only 
Office employees and representatives 
were entertained, the entertainment often 
took place close to UC headquarters. Ac-
cording to OAG, it is not economically 
prudent to reimburse employees for meals 
or entertainment when they are at or in the 
vicinity of their workplace. 
Further, OAG noted that the UC also 
uses the Administrative Fund to reimburse 
UC executives for contributions, gifts, and 
miscellaneous expenses. OAG found that 
from July 1, 1991 through April 30, 1992, 
reimbursed expenditures of the executives 
reviewed totalled $2,473 for contribu-
tions, $11,578 for gifts, and $21,211 for 
miscellaneous expenditures. 
In its audit of the UC's system of com-
pensating executives for business-related 
travel expenses, OAG found that the UC's 
general travel policies were not always 
helpful in determining whether costs were 
legitimate. For example, OAG claimed 
that the UC policy which states that only 
those travel expenses that are "ordinary 
and necessary" are eligible for reimburse-
ment does not clearly define that phrase. 
Although OAG found no policies govern-
ing the use of frequent-flyer miles earned 
while traveling on business, OAG 
believes that it is reasonable to expect that 
these types of earned miles be used for UC 
business; OAG noted one instance when 
Gardner used frequent-flyer miles earned 
while on UC business to purchase a round-
trip flight to Hong Kong valued at $3,880 
for his daughter. 
According to OAG, there were several 
instances where executives claimed un-
necessary lodging expenses. For example, 
Gardner stayed at a San Francisco hotel 
for two nights during a Regents meeting 
at a cost to the UC of $370, even though 
the location of the meeting was approx-
imately ten miles from the UC's Oakland 
headquarters. OAG also noted that some 
executives used their Administrative Fund 
allocation to pay for first-class travel on 
business flights; according to OAG, it 
does not benefit the UC when its 
employees choose first-class travel if 
more economical means are available. 
Finally, OAG reviewed the cir-
cumstances surrounding the move of the 
President's Office to new administrative 
offices. OAG noted that beginning in 
1988, the Office consolidated its opera-
tions in the Kaiser building in Oakland 
from seven locations in Berkeley. Accord-
ing to OAG, the UC perceived the move 
as a way to reduce the overall long-term 
cost of its leased space, resolve organiza-
tional problems of managing a staff lo-
cated on multiple sites, and provide the 
UC's Berkeley campus with much needed 
space. In addition, an office in Irvine was 
leased in order to establish a UC presence 
in southern California and provide space 
for other university functions. OAG noted 
that the total cost of the Irvine office over 
the UC's five-year lease, including lease 
payments, tenant improvements, and fur-
nishings, exceeds $1.2 million, or an aver-
age of $240,000 per year. OAG further 
noted that because of budget considera-
tions, the UC intends to abandon the Irvine 
lease when it expires in January 1993. 
To ensure that the UC fulfills its 
responsibility to the public and govern-
ments that contribute to its funding, OAG 
recommended that the UC and, as ap-
propriate, the Regents, take the following 
actions in regard to compensation and 
benefits for UC executives: 
-ensure that any officials approving 
executive compensation and benefits 
receive accurate and complete informa-
tion so that the officials can make well-in-
formed decisions and staff can implement 
the decisions as the officials intended; 
-charge leave balances for unreported 
leave taken; 
-clarify its policy requiring leave 
reporting; 
-ensure that the proper officials ap-
prove any compensation payments and 
exceptions that require approval; 
-ensure that it consistently reports all 
taxable compensation or reimbursements 
for executives to the taxation authorities; 
-ensure that it does not grant reloca-
tion incentives to executives who do not 
relocate as a condition of their employ-
ment; 
-clarify its policies regarding ap-
propriate entertainment and travel expen-
ditures and decide whether, or the extent 
to which, the Administrative Fund should 
be used to reimburse meals and lodging 
within the vicinity of UC employees' 
headquarters; 
-clarify its policies regarding whether, 
or the extent to which, the Administrative 
Fund should be used to entertain 
employees of the Office of the President 
exclusively; 
-ensure that contributions, gifts, and 
other miscellaneous expenses that it reim-
burses are clearly documented and ap-
propriately made; and 
-ensure that frequent-flyer bonuses 
that executives receive while on official 
business are used for the UC's benefit and 
not for individual benefit. 
While the UC agreed with some of 
OAG's recommendations and immedi-
ately commenced addressing those rec-
ommendations, it disagreed with the fol-
lowing OAG conclusions: 
-while OAG questions the accuracy 
and sufficiency of information provided to 
the Regents when the Regents approved 
fiscal year 1984-85 salary increases for 
certain executives, the UC believes the 
information was correctly conveyed by 
Gardner; 
-while the UC acknowledges that it 
paid two executives at rates higher than 
those approved by the Regents, the UC 
believes that it paid the executives 
amounts to which they were entitled anrl 
will seek retroactive approval from the 
Regents; 
-the UC does not agree that executives 
should be required to report absences in 
increments of less than one day or that the 
UC should reconsider the amount of sick 
leave it allows executives to accrue; 
-the UC does not agree that it should 
reevaluate its policies regarding reimbur-
sement of extraordinary travel and enter-
tainment expenses; and 
-the UC does not agree that it should 
ensure that its employees use frequent-
flyer awards that they earn while on UC 
business for business purposes only. 
Gardner was succeeded as UC Presi-
dent on October 1 by UC Irvine Chancel-
lor Jack Peltason. Just prior to his depar-
ture, Gardner issued new rules on spend-
ing in response to OAG's report; these 
policies include a ban on most first-class 
air travel-unless absolutely necessary-
and a requirement that entertainment paid 
with administrative funds serve "a clear 
university business purpose." Although 
OAG's findings were described by one 
Regent as "extraordinarily immaterial," 
other Regents acknowledged that the audit 
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showed "a complete breakdown" in finan-
cial oversight and that the Regents had 
fallen into "a state of disrepute" with the 
public. 
Other Audits. Additionally, OAG 
produced the following reports during the 
past few months: 
• Report No. P-135 (June 1992) 
reviews the Department of General 
Services' procurement and material 
management practices; 
• Report No. F-104 (June 1992) 
reviews the State Treasurer's Statement of 
Securities Accountability as of June 30, 
1991; 
• Report No. P-134 (July 1992) 
reviews court services in San Bernardino 
County; 
• Report No. P-142 (July 1992) 
reviews selected areas of the Chino 
Unified School District's Building Pro-
gram; 
• Report No. 1-214 (August 1992) 
summarizes OAG 's investigations be-
tween January 1991 and July 1992 of im-
proper activities ranging from the misuse 
of state resources to abuse of official posi-
tion; and 
• Report No. P-141 (September 1992) 
reviews the Judges' Retirement System. 
■ LEGISLATION 
AB 3036 (Eaves) would have required 
the Auditor General to study the long-term 
financial impact on the State Highway 
Account of the conversion of motor 
vehicles to low- or zero-emission alterna-
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The Little Hoover Commission was created by the legislature in 1961 and 
became operational in the spring of 1962. 
(Government Code sections 8501 et seq.) 
Although considered to be within the ex-
ecutive branch of state government for 
budgetary purposes, the law states that 
"the Commission shall not be subject to 
the control or direction of any officer or 
employee of the executive branch except 
in connection with the appropriation of 
funds approved by the Legislature." 
(Government Code section 8502.) 
Statute provides that no more than 
seven of the thirteen members of the Com-
mission may be from the same political 
party. The Governor appoints five citizen 
members, and the legislature appoints four 
citizen members. The balance of the mem-
bership is comprised of two Senators and 
two Assemblymembers. 
This unique formulation enables the 
Commission to be California's only truly 
independent watchdog agency. However, 
in spite of its statutory independence, the 
Commission remains a purely advisory 
entity only empowered to make recom-
mendations. 
The purpose and duties of the Commis-
sion are set forth in Government Code 
section 8521. The Code states: "It is the 
purpose of the Legislature in creating the 
Commission, to secure assistance for the 
Governor and itself in promoting 
economy, efficiency and improved service 
in the transaction of the public business in 
the various departments, agencies, and in-
strumentalities of the executive branch of 
the state government, and in making the 
operation of all state departments, agen-
cies, and instrumentalities and all expen-
ditures of public funds, more directly 
responsive to the wishes of the people as 
expressed by their elected representa-
tives .... " 
The Commission seeks to achieve 
these ends by conducting studies and 
making recommendations as to the adop-
tion of methods and procedures to reduce 
government expenditures, the elimination 
of functional and service duplication, the 
abolition of unnecessary services, pro-
grams and functions, the definition or 
redefinition of public officials' duties and 
responsibilities, and the reorganization 
and or restructuring of state entities and 
programs. The Commission holds hear-
ings about once a month on topics that 
come to its attention from citizens, legis-
lators, and other sources. 
■ MAJOR PROJECTS 
No Room for Johnny: A New Ap-
proach to the School Facilities Crisis 
(June 1992). According to this Little 
Hoover Commission report, California 
schools face a dramatic increase in the 
K-12 student population through the end 
of this decade, with today's 5.1 million 
students expected to balloon to 7 million 
by the year 2000. Estimates of the con-
struction costs to provide school facilities 
for these children range from $30-35 bil-
lion, if no cost-saving alternatives are 
used. The Commission notes that during a 
California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1992) 
period when the state must decide where 
to spend its limited resources, schools 
must compete with many other infrastruc-
ture demands. Additionally, school dis-
tricts are hindered by a complex facilities 
project approval process involving multi-
ple state agencies, certain state policies 
which make it difficult for districts to pur-
sue proactive asset management, and a 
lack of cohesive communities of interest 
to support school construction projects. 
According to the Commission, the 
state's role as the provider of funds for 
school facilities is inappropriate; the state 
should not be a "bottomless pocket" for 
school facilities spending while the 
authority for decisions regarding school 
facilities funding is firmly vested at the 
local school district level. In spite of the 
local control over education, numerous 
court decisions have indicated that the 
state must act to protect the right of stu-
dents to equal access to education; it is 
California's responsibility to ensure that 
the state's various school facilities are 
equitable. The Commission suggested 
that the Governor and legislature take the 
following actions regarding the facilities 
funding process: 
-modify the Leroy F. Greene State 
School Building Lease Purchase program 
to return the responsibility of funding new 
school facilities to the local school dis-
tricts, thereby limiting the state's financial 
role to assuring equity and providing a 
safety net; 
-require the state Department of 
Education to convene a task force to deter-
mine advisory (rather than prescriptive) 
standards for adequate, modern school 
facilities that can be adopted by the state 
in place of the current minimum stand-
ards; and 
-place a constitutional amendment 
before voters to modify the approval 
threshold of general obligation bonds in a 
manner consistent with the most cost-ef-
fective use of the bonds issued. 
Even with adequate funds available for 
construction of new school facilities, the 
Commission found that the state has 
created a cumbersome program that mi-
cromanages school construction projects, 
thus delaying the completion and driving 
up the cost of new school facilities. The 
state's permit review and planning process 
for new school facilities may take 18 
months or longer, during which a project 
is reviewed by the local school district, the 
Department of Education, the Office of 
Local Assistance, the State Allocation 
Board, and the Office of the State Ar-
chitect. Delays caused by this process 
often add to the cost for new facilities in 
both rising land values and in higher con-
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